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1. Barratry, polysemy and law courts   
To state the blind obvious, when early modern civil law courts had to qualify some facts, they 
searched the civil law sources for suitable legal principles. Normally they found more than 
enough. Normally, but not always. Sometimes, civil law sources did not provide a solution. 
When this happened, the facts of the case had to be interpreted through rules and categories 
thought for wholly different situations. This process is particularly evident in commercial law. 
The early modern period saw an exponential increase in commercial litigation before law 
courts, but not many commercial subjects (particularly in their current application) had clear 
links with Justinian’s compilation. Asserting their jurisdiction on such subjects, law courts had 
to be particularly proactive. But they could not invent new remedies. Rather, they had to adapt 
existing ones, even when this adaptation was in fact a creative process.  
The present contribution looks at one of such cases: the fraud of the shipmaster, typically 
known as barratry. Insurance did not develop out of Justinian’s compilation, and civil lawyers 
had a hard time trying to find a foothold in the Roman law sources.1 This meant that the bench 
had to adapt principles and legal solutions devised and developed for very different situations.  
What makes the case of barratry particularly interesting is the polysemy of the term. By the 
time learned judges started dealing with maritime barratry, they were already well familiar with 
the other meanings of the term. This probably favoured the adaptation process, but it also left 
a deep mark on its outcome: the weight of those other meanings of the same term had a 
significant impact on the qualification of maritime barratry.  
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(2015), p. 323-364. Cf. Id., Insurance in Elizabethan England. The London Code, Cambridge 2016, p. 4-14.  
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In English, there are two main senses in which the term 'barratry' is used. The first is the offence 
of exciting quarrels; the second that of fraud. This second meaning, in turn, has three main 
different applications. Hence the four different entries that can be found in the Oxford English 
Dictionary: i. purchase or sale of ecclesiastical preferment; ii. acceptance of bribes by a judge; 
iii. barratry in a maritime sense; iv. habitually exciting quarrels and vexatious litigation. Each 
of these meanings had a close counterpart in civil law, so that their examination can proceed 
together. We may start with the last one. 
 
2. Brawl and deceit 
Among Anglo-American scholars, the meaning of barratry as exciting quarrels (whether 
physical or legal ones), is usually ascribed to the influence of Old Norse 'barátta', meaning 
fight, struggle, and so brawl (‘barsmið’ meant ‘assault’ – e.g. 'síðastr barsmið' meant ‘the last 
assault’). In this sense, a barrator is a quarrelsome man (literally, a ‘fight-picker’). If we were 
to accept this origin, its adaptation to legal terminology would seem rather linear: if a barrator 
is someone used to brawling, there is no reason why the same term should not be employed to 
describe the picking up of legal quarrels, as opposed to physical ones. Indeed the proximity 
between the two contexts is apparent in the sources, first of all the description of the 'common 
barretor' in Coke's reports.2 Possibly, it is assumed, the violence implied in the Old Norse 
'barátta' might have been tempered by the conflation with the Old French 'barat', which implied 
the idea of deceit. After all, it would hardly be the first case of an encounter between Norse 
and French languages in English. This 'conflation' theory is the most accredited today, 
especially among legal scholars.3 The problem is that, on closer scrutiny, such a theory appears 
rather weak. One does not need Old Norse to account for the use of the term barratry in English. 
More than that, acknowledging any Norse influence would considerably narrow the polysemy 
of the term barattaria as used in Romance languages, without much reason for doing so.  
Appealing as it might seem, establishing an Old Norse pedigree to the English term 'barratry' 
lacks strong ground. Neither is the barrator a trained warrior, nor is brawl a proper fight. In Old 
Norse the opposite is true. The Old Norse 'barátta' is closely associated to ‘barsmið’ ('fight') 
and ‘baráttumaðr’ (or ‘barráturfullr’, 'warrior').4 Far from being a common scoundrel, 
                                                     
2 The Case of Barretry (1588), 8 Co. Rep. 36b-37b: ‘barretor is a common mover or stirrer up, or maintainer of 
suits, quarrels, or parties, either in courts or in the country: in courts of record, and in the county, hundred, and 
other inferior courts: in the country in three manners. 1. In disturbance of the peace. 2. In taking or detaining of 
the possession of houses, lands or goods, etc., which are in question or controversy, not only by force, but also by 
subtilty and deceit, and for the most part in suppression of truth and right. 3. By false invention, and sowing of 
calumny, rumours, and reports, whereby discord and disquiet arise between neighbours. and all the said qualities 
of a common barretor are proved by the indictment of one for barretry, and by our books: for first it is said in the 
indictment, quod est communis barrectator, within which word is included a quarreller in his own cause, and a 
mover or maintainer of quarrels between others, for the most part in suppression of truth and right … a common 
barretor is principally an offender in moving or maintaining of  quarrels at bars, scil. in courts, or in the country, 
which are causes of suits in courts, he is called a barretor, or bar offender. ... in the law of England, this word 
(barret) doth signify a quarrel, whence he who moves or maintains quarrels is called a barretor; and it is so 
expounded by the whole Parliament, in 33 E. l. in Stat' De Conspir' where the act saith, stewards and bailiffs of 
great lords, who by their seigniory, office, or power, take upon them to maintain or sustain pleas or barrets, for 
other parties than those which touch their lords or themselves. Where it is manifest, that barrets signifies quarrels’ 
(emphasis in the text). Cf. 3 Edw. 1 c.33 (the first Statute of Westminster of 1275): ‘qe nul Viscont ne suffre 
barettour ou maintener de paroles en Countees, ne seneschalx de graunt seignors, ne d<’>autres q<u>i ne soit 
attourne a son seignur, a seute faire, ou seuter defaire, les Justicementz des Countees, ne pronuncier les 
Justicementz, si ne soit especialment prie et requis de ceo faire de touz le seutours, et les attournes des seutours, 
qi y serront a le journe ; et si nul le face, le Roi se prendra grevousement, et a viscount, et a luy.’ 
3 See esp. the recent and thorough analysis of D.C. Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws, 
Cambridge 2014, p. 66-67, who even traces the use of the term 'barratry' from Britton to the late sixteenth century. 
4 R.G. Arthur, English-Old Norse Dictionary, Cambridge (Ontario) 2002, available at: 
http://www.yorku.ca/inpar/language/English-Old_Norse.pdf. 
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‘baráttumaðr’ was a proper warrior, and ‘bardagi’ does not convey the idea of a violent quarrel, 
but of an actual fight (‘barsmið’). In Egil's Saga, for instance, we find the line 'Barðisk vel, sás 
varði' ('Well did the warrior fight').5 The fight can be a full-scale battle or a duel, but it always 
conveys the idea of proper combat. So for instance the Brennu-Njáls saga reads 'En ef þú vilt 
eigi berjast við mig þá skalt þú af allri fjárheimtunni' ('but if thou wilt not fight with me, then 
thou shalt give up all claim to these goods').6 This is clearly a duel, not a battle. But the kind 
of physical confrontation is ultimately the same. There is another term in Old Norse that 
conveys the idea of a fight, but in a less specific sense: ‘atganga’. This is not a proper combat 
between warriors, but it may be used for any sort of physical confrontation. The same Brennu-
Njáls saga has also the line 'Hrútur ætlað að veita honum atgöngu en treystust eigi' ('Hrut and 
his brother had it in their minds to make an onslaught on him, but they mistrusted their 
strength’).7 More examples could be given on ‘barsmið’ – though of course one should avoid 
tracing too neat contours of the exact meaning of a word. But the point stands: the conflation 
between the violence of Old Norse 'barátta' and the cunning of the Old French 'barat' would 
need to be considerably better substantiated. The Norse influence could only account for the 
(rather marginal) meaning of barratry-brawl, excluding the main component, that of fraud and 
deceit. This is why, having looked at the North, we should turn our attention to the South. 
 
The Old French 'barat', together with its equivalent in late medieval Latin barataria (or 
barattaria), may easily explain the origin of barratry in the English language - in all its 
meanings. And there is little doubt that 'barat' did mean fraud. Indeed, it is in this sense that we 
find the word used in Britton ('par barat et par contek', meaning 'by fraud and extortion').8 By 
the time of Britton (late thirteenth century) the term barratry was already present in all Romance 
languages. So for instance the Siete Partidas punished those 'baratadores et engañadores' who 
tricked merchant into lending them money pretending to be solvent, when in fact they were 
penniless.9 The same term was also present in coeval Latin. In his Glossarium Charles du 
Cange recalled the Chronica Majora of Matthew of Paris, but one could give several other 
examples, such as the Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam, writing of the impostor ('baratator et 
trufator') who pretended to be Frederick II and stirred the German populace.10  
In medieval Italian city-states, barator is a term commonly employed (and attested in many 
variants). Initially, it probably did not denote any specific activity but rather described a base 
and infamous way of living, which impacted on the social consideration of those who lived in 
that way. Quite probably, the different meanings of the term were just adaptations to diverse 
contexts of the same underlying concept.11 In a more specific legal sense the term starts to 
appear during the thirteenth century in the statutes of northern Italian city-states. There, 
barattaria is attested as disreputable gambling at the least from the second half of the thirteenth 
                                                     
5 Egil's Saga, W.C. Green (transl.), London 1893, ch. 49 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the Saga of the Ere-
Dwellers one finds the line 'Það sumar, áður bardaginn var í Álftafirði' (That summer, before the fight was in 
Swanfirth). The Saga of the Ere-Dwellers, W. Morris and E. Magnusson (transl.), London 1892, ch. 45 (emphasis 
added). 
6 Brennu-Njáls Saga, G.W. Dasent (transl.), Edinburgh 1861, ch. 8 (emphasis added).  
7 Ibid., ch. 24 (emphasis added). 
8 Britton, lib. 4, ch. 3, para. 3 (F.M. Nichols ed.), Oxford 1865, vol. 2, p. 176: '... et ausi a la reverse porra hom 
presenter par extorsiount maugré le verrei possessour par barat et par contek.'   
9 Siete Partidas, part. 7. tit. 16, ley 9 ('Del engaño que facen los baratadores faciendo muestra que han algo').  
10  '… Processu enim temporis repertum est quod quidam baratator et trufator erat qui talia simulabat ad lucrum; 
et sic tam ipse quam sui sequaces ad nichilum sunt redacti.' Salimbene De Adam da Parma, Cronica, G. Scalia 
(ed.), Bari 1966, p. 784. 
11 Cf. P. Mazzamuto, s.v. ‘Barattiere’, in Enciclopedia Dantesca, vol. 1, Rome 1970, p. 509-514, at 509-510. See 
also the seminal work of L. Zdekauer, Il giuoco in Italia nei secoli XIII e XIV, Archivio storico italiano, 4th series, 
18 (1886), p. 20-74, and 19 (1887), p. 3-22, now in Id., Il giuoco d'azzardo nel Medioevo Italiano, Florence 1993, 
esp. p. 42-55. 
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century. The baracterius or baraterius (a term also attested in several other Latin and especially 
vernacular variants) is first and foremost a gambler.12 The licence to run a gambling house was 
often called gabella (or dacium) baratariae, where the term barataria conveys the idea of 
sordid (and sinful) gambling.13 The Veronese statutes of 1276 contained a full chapter on 
barrators.14 In the same years other northern Italian cities were selling licences for gambling 
houses or farming out the gambling monopoly (against conspicuous fees), and the language 
employed soon moved from the generic ludus to the more specific barateius.15 This might 
account for the derogatory sense of the term, and especially for the close association between 
barratry and fraudulent activities. In prohibiting barataria, for instance, the Statutes of 
Alessandria of 1297 also forbade ‘anything else that is or might be or might be understood as 
barratry or the fraud of barratry, by whatever name is called’ (‘aliquod aliud quod sit vel esse 
possit vel intelligi barataria vel fraus baratariae quocumque nomine censeatur').16 The term 
barataria was progressively transposed into legal terminology and adapted to different 
contexts, but its original meaning remained in use for a long while, even among lawyers.17 
A term often associated with 'barataria' and 'barateius' is that of 'ribaldus'. Ribaldi are typically 
described as compulsive gamblers leading a dissolute life. In the late thirteenth-century statutes 
of Carrù (in Piedmont, near Cuneo), for instance, 'ribaldus' is defined as the gambler who would 
squander anything for a bet - 'up to his vest' ('se spoliat ad ludum taxillorum azarii usque ad 
                                                     
12 See first of all the remarkable collection of medieval municipal provisions on gaming in A. Rizzi (ed.), Statuta 
de ludo. The laws governing games and gaming in Italian communes (XIII-XVI centuries), Viella-Treviso-Rome 
2012. Within this vast collection, particular attention ought to be paid to the following provisions: doc. 223, p. 
110; doc. 229, p. 111; doc. 335, p. 132; doc. 403, p. 142-143; docs. 404, 408 and 409, p. 143; doc. 421, p. 145; 
doc. 427, p. 146; doc. 432, p. 147; doc. 434, p. 147-148; doc. 435, p. 148; doc. 437, p. 148-149; docs. 438, 441 
and 442, p. 149; doc. 443, p. 149-150; doc. 444, p. 150; docs. 453-456, p. 151-152; doc. 508, p. 159; doc. 509, p. 
159-160; doc. 547, p. 165; doc. 629, p. 178; doc. 655, p. 183; doc. 817, p. 210; doc. 1433, p. 302; doc. 2699, p. 
481-482; doc. 2700, p. 482; docs. 2823-24, p. 504; doc. 2926, p. 526-527; doc. 3103, p. 567. 
13 See G. Ortalli, Barattieri: Il gioco d'azzardo fra economia ed etica. Secoli XIII-XIV, Bologna 2012, p. 11-12, 
21, 30-31 (on the earliest uses of the term in a legal context), and 39-48 (on the use of the term in society and 
literature). 
14 G. Sandri (ed.), Gli statuti veronesi del 1276: colle correzioni e le aggiunte fino al 1323, Rome 1940, vol. 1, 
lib. 3, ch. 128, p. 473-475. The additions to the statutes of Verona are of interest to our purposes especially because 
of the specific point in the statutes where they were inserted. Just a year after the promulgation of the statutes, a 
new chapter was added on blasphemous gamblers, and it was inserted immediately after the one on barattieri 
(ibid., p. 475). Further, in 1302 an addition was inserted on ch. 128, dealing with both barattieri and prostitutes 
(ibid., p. 473-475). On the same Veronese statutes see also G. Ortalli, Barattieri (note 13), p. 34-37. In the years 
immediately following the promulgation of the statutes, it is even attested the compilation of a 'list of barrators' 
(cronica barateriorum), listing all the serial gamblers of the city: G. Ortalli, Barattieri (note 13), p. 66-67. See 
further ibid., p. 66-74. 
15 G. Ortalli, Barattieri (note 13), p. 48-66. Cf. L. Zdekauer, Sull'organizzazione pubblica del giuoco in Italia nel 
medio evo, in Id., Il giuoco d'azzardo nel Medioevo Italiano, Florence 1993, esp. p. 99-117. 
16 Statutes of Alessandria (published in 1547), in Rizzi (note 12), doc. 403, p. 142-143 (emphasis added). 
17 See e.g. Prosperus Farinacci (1554-1618), Prosperi Farinacii ... Praxis et Theoricae Criminalis Amplissimae, 
Pars Tertia, Francofurt[is], 1605, q. 109, pt. 4, p. 623, n. 137: 'Regula sit, quod retinens domi ludum, vltra domus 
publicantorem, et quod impune ei potest damnum, et iniuria inferri, videtur adhuc alia extraordinaria poena 
puniendus ... et vide in proposito Vrbis bannimenta edita de anno 1591 nu. 7, in quibus retinentes barattarias, et 
biscazas, vt illorum verbis vtar, puniuntur poena triremium per quinquennium.'  
Cf. Dominicus Ursaya, Institutiones criminales usui etiam forensi accomodatae ..., Romae, ex Typographia 
Josephi Monaldi, 1701, lib. 3, tit. 10, p. 52, n. 25: 'Hujusmodi autem personae Domus ad hunc effectum retinentes 
dicuntur Barattariam, seu Biscazza excercere, et gravius puniendi sunt, quam ipsimet Ludentes ... quod non potest 
quis dici Barattariam, et Biscazza tenere, nisi emolumenti, et lucri causa principaliter ludunt retineat Domi.'  
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camiciam').18 Sometimes the terms ribaldus and barateius were used interchangeably.19 It is 
with ribaldus (‘ribald’ in English) that one finds the closest affinity with the English 'barrator' 
in the sense of quarrelsome and violent person. The affinity between barator and ribaldus is 
readily intelligible - suffices to think that the term still in use today to describe the Campanian 
mafia in Italy ('camorra') in all probability derives from ca-morra (morra meaning gamble). 
Indeed, the term ribaldaria was sometimes used to identify a gambling house (where barrators 
would play). The image of the barateius/ribaldus as a quarrelsome, vicious gambler - or just a 
quarrelsome and base person - is present in all Romance languages. The barattieri accepted 
any task, even the basest, and were often employed as spies, cesspit cleaners, and especially 
mercenaries recruited for the most dangerous tasks. If there was a brawl, one could be sure to 
find barattieri involved.  
Unlike barattaria, however, ribaldaria is not a polysemic term. Broad as it may be, it always 
conveys the idea of deceit: ribaldus meant rascal, crook, swindler. Precisely because of its 
unequivocal meaning, this term was useful to describe the barratry of the shipmaster. 
Barattaria and ribaldaria are closer to each other than one might think even in legal 
terminology. Civil lawyers often treated them as coterminous words.20 The first jurist writing 
a treatise on insurance, the Portuguese Petrus Santerna (Pedro de Santarém, c.1460–?), defined 
barratry as ‘that case, which is commonly called ribaldaria of the master’.21 Perhaps more 
revealing is the second and only other occasion in which he uses the term in his treatise. This 
time, the subject is no longer the shipmaster but the Jews: Santerna warned his reader that, 
despite trading with a Jew is lawful, all Jews are cursed and ribaldi.22 The warning could hardly 
be clearer: one can trade with a Jew but should not trust him, for he is inherently dishonest - so 
one should expect some mischief. The concept of barratry of the shipmaster (barattaria 
patroni) was precisely the same. In this sense, ribaldaria is very close to barrateria. It is 
probably not fortuitous that in Santerna’s native country, Portugal, with the passage to the 
vernacular the barratry of the shipmaster was termed ribaldaria ('barataría ou ribaldia de 
patrão').23 
 
                                                     
18 Statutes of Carrù, in Rizzi (note 12), docs. 196 and 2742, p. 105 and 489 respectively. See also the statutes of 
Cuneo of 1380, ibid., doc. 1493, p. 311: 'ribaldus intelligatur, in quolibet casu criminali, qui se expoliavit ad ludum 
usque ad camisiam ab uno anno citra, numerando vel computando a die maleficii in eum commissi, vel de quo 
manifestum et notorium esset ipsum esse publicum ribaldum ...'. Cf. the similar description in the statutes of the 
near-by town of Villanova Canavese (near Turin) of 1391, ibid., doc. 1429, p. 302: 'Ribaldus vero intelligatur qui 
vilem et deploratam duxerit vitam, item qui non habet unde vivat qui ludit pannos dorsi usque ad camisiam, vel 
qui maiori parte temporis conversatur in tabernis.' See further ibid., doc. 432, p. 147; doc. 435, p. 148; doc. 1498, 
p. 312; doc. 1544, p. 320; doc. 2928, p. 528; doc. 2989, p. 545; doc. 3093, p. 566. 
19 As the statutes of Faenza of 1410-14 had it, 'ribaldi autem et viles et abiecte persone esse intelligantur ... nuptii 
et familiares officialium de barateria seu conductorum baratarie.' Statutes of Faenza of 1410-14, in Rizzi (note 
12), doc. 419, p. 145. See also the Statute of Lucca of 1308 and that of Parma of 1347, ibid., docs. 432 and 439, 
p. 147 and 149, respectively. See further G. Ortalli, Barattieri (note 13), p. 42, where ample literature. It is also 
interesting to note how in Tuscany the chief of the barrators ('rex baracteriorum') was often also called 'rex 
ribaldorum': I. Taddei, Gioco d'azzardo, ribaldi e baratteria nelle città della Toscana tardo-medievale, 31(2) 
(1996) Quaderni storici, p. 335-362, at 347-349. 
20 Franciscus Roccus (1605-1676), De Assecvrationibus, in Id., Responsorum legalium cum decisionibus centuria 
secunda ac mercatorum notabilia in sex titulos distributa, Neapoli, ex Typographia Lucae Antonij Fusci, 
sumptibus Iacobi Antonii Bagnuli, 1655, not. 44, n. 139, p. 404. 
21 Petrus Santerna, Tractatvs pervtilis et quotidianus, De Assecvrationibus et Sponsionibus Mercatorum, à D. 
Petro Santerna Lusitano ... aeditus, Antverpiae, apud Gerardum Spelmannum, 1554, pt. 3, fol. 47v, n. 82 ('ille 
casus, vulgo qui dicitur Ribaldaria patroni'), emphasis added. 
22 Ibid., pt. 5, fol. 83r-v, n. 23. 
23 E.g. A. Teixeira de Freitas Senior, Vocabulario Juridico, Rio de Janeiro 1882, s.v. 'Ribaldia': 'Ribaldia is any 
unfaithfulness or bad faith, committed by the shipmaster in the exercise of his nautical duties' (Ribaldia é qualquer 
infidelidade, ou má fé, commettida pêlo Capitão do Navio no cumprimento de suas obrigações náuticas).  
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3. Bribing a magistrate 
Another meaning of the term barratry is the acceptance of bribes by a judge. This meaning is 
attested in the civil law tradition, but not in common law.24 So for instance it is found in Scots 
law, but now also in English law. According to Erskine's Principles of the Law of Scotland 'this 
crime of exchanging justice for money, was afterwards called by the doctors baratria, from the 
Italian barattare, to truck a barter.'25 This meaning has a long history in civil law, and it is 
important to spend a few words on it.  
The use of barratry to signify the corruption of a magistrate probably originates in the context 
of the medieval Italian city-state. In his Divine Comedy, for instance, Dante has a particularly 
nasty place for barattieri in the canti 21 and 22 of Inferno.26 The crime would clearly appear 
to be an adaptation of the crimen repetundarum (the extortion by a magistrate) to the late 
medieval city-state context, but we should be mindful of the peculiarities of such a context, as 
they might well account for its different nuances vis-à-vis the Roman law crime. Indeed, if we 
look at the definition of the crimen repetundarum in the Accursian Gloss we find the (medieval 
city-state) notion of barattaria. For Accursius the crime of extortion was first and foremost a 
grave case of abuse of power and a most serious violation of the basic civic duties of the 
magistrate.27 Accursius did not refer to this crimen in the vernacular, both because of his typical 
reluctance to use vernacular expressions and because the term barrataria was not yet 
commonly employed in a legal context. But later jurists did. Among them Baldus provided a 
particularly significant definition of barratry, in all probability the most commonly cited in 
early modern civil law literature.28 In a city-state context, this crimen was probably even more 
heinous than our concept of graft.29 This might account for the widespread idea that barratry 
(in the medieval sense of repetundae) is a capital crime.30 
Baldus' notion of barratry was then consolidated in the work of some among the most illustrious 
jurists of the next generation, especially his student Petrus de Ancharano (1333-1416),31 and it 
finally appeared in the greatly influential (and widely read) treatise of Paris de Puteo (Paride 
                                                     
24 Although barratry in the common law does not have this meaning, some links between barratry and judicial 
corruption are not difficult to find: see esp. the very accurate and interesting work of Victor Saucedo, Conspiracy. 
A Conceptual Genealogy (Thirteenth to Early Eighteenth Century), Madrid 2017, p. 94-100. While judicial 
corruption was qualified in terms of conspiracy, supporting false claims (and so, picking up legal quarrels) could 
be qualified as barratry. 
25 John Erskine, The Principles of the Law of Scotland: In the order of Sir George Mackenzie's Institutions of that 
Law (6th edn.), Edinburgh, printed for John Balfour, 1783, lib. 4, p. 825, n. 30. 
26 In the Inferno the terms 'barratry' (baratteria) and 'barrator' (barattier, baratti) are used five times in the sense 
of grafting and corruption: Canto 11, line 60; Canto 21, line 41; Canto 22, lines 53, 87 and 136. As it is well 
known, Dante himself was condemned (in all probability, unjustly) for the same crime on 27 January 1302. 
27 Gloss ad Dig. 48.11.1pr, § Cepit (Parisiis 1566, vol. 3, col. 1508): 'a priuato: vt faciat non faciendum, vel omittat 
faciendum ... et dic quod etiam durante officio accusatur: quia in officio delinquit, vel quia subiectos opprimit'. 
28 Baldus, ad C.4.2.16 (super Sexto Codicis, Ludguni, 1539, fol. 9r): 'Qui pecuniam iudici mutuat presumitur 
iudicem corrumpere, et qui propter honorem publicum consequendum dat pecuniam exilij poena punitur h[oc] 
d[icitur] in officiali recipienti licet adijciatur titulus mutui presumitur barataria'. Cf. Id. ad D.3.6.3 (In Primam 
Digesti veteris partem commentaria, Venetiis, 1577, fol. 218r). 
29 Hence I would be somewhat reluctant to follow the mainstream English literature on the subject, for which see 
esp. J.T. Noonan Jr, Bribes, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1984, p. 249-250, and, more recently, J. Steinberg, Dante and 
the Limits of the Law, Chicago 2013, p. 160. 
30 The qualification of barratry as a capital crime is also in good part a legacy of the same Baldus, not because he 
argued as much for first but because the weight of his authority among later jurists. Baldus, de Sindicatu 
officialium, in Tractatvs Illvstrivm in vtraque tvm Pontificii, tvm Caesarei iusi facultate Iurisconsultorum, De 
Contractibus, et alijs illicitus ... tomvs septimvs, Venetiis [Zilettus], 1584, fol. 226r, n. 39: 'et inter maximas causas 
capita est barataria: quia tunc tenetur crimine falsi'. 
31 See esp. Petrus de Ancharano (1333-1416), Consilia, Venetiis, 1490, cons. 272: '... delictum quod dicitur 
barateria quod crimen vulgus interpretatur esse illud quod committitur per iudicem mediante pecunia ...'. 
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del Pozzo, 1413-1493).32 Already by the early fifteenth century the crime of barratry is attested 
for other public officials. For instance, in a consilium of another of Baldus' students (probably 
the most famous of them all), Paulus Castrensis (Paolo di Castro, d.1441), dating to the late 
1420s or - more probably - the early 1430s, Castrensis argued that the custom officer who 
falsified the account-books to pocket part of the custom would commit barratry.33  
 
Outside the city-state context, the crime would soon lose its political features and focus 
exclusively on judicial corruption.34 It is sufficient to look at authors like Aegidius Bossius 
(Egidio Bossi, c.1488-1546),35 Josephus Mascardus (Giuseppe Mascardi, c.1540-1585),36 
Prospero Farinacci (1554-1618),37 Gabriel Alvarez de Velasco (1595-1658)38 and Lanfranco 
Zacchia (c.1624-1685),39 to name but a few among the most often quoted early modern authors 
on the subject.40  
Some jurists went further and sought to find some etymological explanation for the vernacular 
term barratry, given that it bore no apparent connection with its Roman ancestor repetundae.41 
The most obvious link was with barter (baratum in late medieval Latin). So for some jurists, 
                                                     
32 Excellentissimi ac doctissimi Juris vtriusq[ue] doctoris ... Paris de Puteo Neapolitani in materia Sindicatus 
omniu[m] officialiu[m] Tractatus: vna Tractatus de Sindicatu ..., Ludguni, Vincentius de Portonariis, 1529, fol. 
93v: a judge who accepts bribes 'dicatur corruptus vel baratariam commisisse.'   
33 Paulus Castrensis, Consilia, Nurinberge, 1485, cons. 153: 'incidit in penas statutorm disponentium contra eos 
qui sunt in aliquo officio publico et committunt falsitatem furtum vel baratariam seu fraudem in officio'. 
34 The term ‘barratry’ remained somewhat broader in other fields - suffices to think of Don Quijote's Island of 
Barratry (II.49). 
35 Practica et Tractatvs Varii, seu Quaestiones, Aegidii Bossii ... Basileae, per Sebastianvm Henrici-Petri, Sum. 
ex bibliotheca Ioh. Gregorij a Werdenstein, 1580, § De Officialibus corruptis pecunia, iniusteque iudicantibus, p. 
366-367, n. 1-2: 'si iudex corruptus pecunia iniustitiam fecerit, uel iustum omiserit, dicitur crimen illud 
committere, quod uulgus, baratariam uocat, et acriter puniendus est ... Dic, quando datur ut fiat, uel non fiat iniuste 
et ita sit iniuste, nulla est difficultas, quin simus in tit. ad l[egem] Iul[iam] repet[undarum] (Dig. 48.11) et in 
crimine uulgo appellato barataria ...' 
36 Josephi Mascardi ... Conclusiones Probationum Omnivm Qvibusvis in vtroque Foro versantibus ..., Francofvrti, 
Impensis Joan. Syberti Heyl, Typis Nicolai Kuchenbeckeri, 1661, vol. 1, concl. 164, p. 317, n. 1: 'Barataria (quae 
elegantius repetundae posset dici) probatur ex eo, quod magistratus recipiunt aliquid a privato, ut faciant non 
facienda, vel omittant ea, quae sunt facienda, sic loquutus est Accursius in l. i ff. ad l. Iul. repetund. (Dig. 48.11.1)'. 
See also ibid., concl. 165-166, p. 318-319. 
37 Dn. Prosp[eri] Farinacij ... Consilia siue Responsa atqve Decisiones Cavsarvm Criminalivm, Coloniae 
Allobrogvm, Excudebat Philippvs Gamonetvs, 1649, vol. 1, cons. 5, p. 30 and 33, n. 33 and 53 respectively. 
38 Gabrielis Alvarez de Velasco... Judex Perfectus seu De Judice Perfecto Christo Iesu ... (2nd edn.), Lausonii & 
Coloniae Allobrogum, Sumptibus Marci-Michaelis Bousquet & sociorum, 1740, annot. 11, n. 1-2: 'Advertendum 
in primis, Barattariae nomen barbarum esse, neque apuid legum conditores, neque Latinitatis Parentes aut 
Professores usquam reperit; a recentioribus Practicis, forentibusque Jurisperitis adinventum, seu excogitatum, 
frequenterque receptum ... proque Repetundarum crimine usurpatum, et Iudicium pecunia corruptum, Iudicem, 
que ita judicantem designas, quasi justitiam. Baractantem id est: Malbarata' (emphasis in the original text). 
39 Lanfranci Zacchiae ... De Salario sev Operariorvm Mercede Tractatus, Romae, Ex Typographia Nicolai 
Tinassi, 1658, q. 69, p. 238, n. 33: 'Vel [gubernatores] barattariam committerent recipiendo indebite pecunias pro 
sententiarum prolatione, tam si pecunias reciperent pro ferenda sententia iniusta ... quam etiam, si illas reciperent, 
vt secundum iustitiam pronunciarent ...' 
40 Mention should also be made of the famed De Brachio Regio, although it contains only a rather short mention 
of barratry: Hortensius Cavalcanus (1558-1623), Tractatus D. Hortensii Cavalcani Fivizanensis …, De Brachio 
Regio …, Marpurgi Cattorum, Excudebat Paulus Egenolphus, 1605, pt. 5, n. 67, p. 519: 'Barataria vero dicitur, 
quando Judex aliquid petit indebitum, ut justitiam faciat'. 
41 On the point, probably the lengthiest (if far from accurate) analysis comes not from civil law but common law 
scholars, especially the late-nineteenth-century New York judge Charles P. Daly, Barratry. Its origin, history and 
meaning, in the maritime laws, New York 1872, esp. p. 15-21. 
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from Amodeus Justinus (Amedeo Giustini, 1403-1477)42 to Tiberius Deciani (1509-1582)43 
and Johannes Bernardinus Muscatelli (Giovanni Bernardino Moscatello, fl.1579),44 the Roman 
crime of repetundae was called barratry because the judge barters justice with money. Clearly, 
this etymological explanation would not entail any difference as to the scope of the crime - at 
least typically.45 On closer scrutiny, however, the consensus among jurists was not complete, 
for some debate remained as to whether barratry could be considered the same as extortio 
(‘ordinary’ extortion) and concussio (extortion with violence, actual or threatened),46 or 
whether (as the medieval jurists had it) it was a more heinous crime than either of them.47 As 
                                                     
42 Justinus, de Syndicatu, in Tractatvs de Syndicatv Variorvm Avthorvm ... a Gabriele Sarayna ... in vnvm congesti 
..., Lvgdvni, apud Heredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1560, fols. 82v-83r, n. 163-165: 'Barataria committitur ab officialibus, 
vbicumque aliquid recipiunt a priuato, vt faciant non facienda, vel omittant ea quae sunt facienda ... Iudicium 
enim iustum, vel iniustum vendere non licet ... Vnde iudex qui per pecuniam vel aliter corrumpitur, dicitur 
baratarius ... Et dicitur barataria a barato baratas: quia iudex recipiendo aliquid, dicitur baratare, et permutare 
iustitiam cum eo, quod recipit, sicut recipiens aliquid pro dando beneficium, dicitur vendere beneficium, et 
barataria pro pecunia'. 
43 Tractatus Criminalis D. Tiberii Deciani ..., Venetiis, Apud Franciscum de Franciscis Senensem, 1590, vol. 2, 
lib. 8, ch. 33, fol. 238v, n 9: 'Barattare, sit commutare, quasi quod iustitia cum pecunia commutetur, vt tradit 
Amode[us Justinus] in tract. de sindic. ... fol. 284, n. 165 [cf. supra, last note] et dicitur tunc committi ab 
officialibus et administratoribus publicis, quando recipiunt aliquid a priuato, vt faciant non facienda, vel omittant 
facienda ...' 
44 Io[hannis] Bernardini Mvscatelli, Practica tvm Civilis S.R. Consilii ... Cum Criminalis, necnon praxis 
Fideivssoria ..., Venetiis, apud Bertanos, 1686, § De iudicis corruptela, concussione, extorsione, et barattaria, p. 
634, n. 21: 'corruptela principaliter, et absolute dicatur respectu iudicis, et officialis ..., barattaria autem ne dum 
dicitur respecto Iudicis, qui dum pecunia corrumptitur baratat iustitiam cum pecunia ...', and p. 635, n. 25: '... 
corruptela regulatiter per barattariam committitur, barattando Iudex iustitiam, pro pecunia iniustitiam per sordes 
committendo, non facienda faciendo, et facienda omittendo ...' 
45 An interesting exception is Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla (c.1547-c.1605), who is worth mentioning because 
of the great popularity he achieved with his main (and probably only) treatise – despite its frightfully long title, 
Política para Corregidores y Señores de vasallos, en tiempo de paz y de guerra y para Juezes ecclesiasticos y 
seglares, y de Sacas, Aduanas, y de Residencias, y sus Oficiales: y para Regidores, y Abogados, y del valor de 
los Corregimientos, y Goviernos Realengos, y de las Ordenes, Amberes, en casa de Juan Bautista Verdussen, 
1704. Bobadilla moved from the premise that both barateria and cohecho (i.e. repetundae) are 'delito de falsedad' 
(vol. 2, lib. 5, ch. 1, p. 442, n. 106), and that they are treated as coterminous by most jurists (ibid., p. 473, n. 228), 
but then he sought to distinguish them. While cohecho is a bribe to 'adjust' a decision ('cohecho propriamente es 
una venta de la justicia recibiendo alguna cosa por hazer mas ò menos contra justicia', ibid.), barratry is an undue 
remuneration to the magistrate to accelerate the course of justice ('pero Barateria es baratar la justicia: que es lo 
mismo que los antiguos Jurisconsultos interpretaron, que era comutar la justicia, recibiendo interes pro hazer, ò 
dexar de hazer algo indevidamente, aunque sin corromper la justicia, como por dar el Juez sentencia justa, ò 
despachar presto el negocio, ò por dar las varas de Tenientes, ò Alguaziles, ò otros oficios por precio', ibid.). As 
such, barratry would not be repetundae, but a somewhat lesser crime. 
46 E.g. Prosperi Farinacii ... Praxis et Theoricae Criminalis Amplissimae (note 17), pt. 3, q. 111, art. 11, p. 687-
689, esp. p. 687, n. 261-264. See also ibid., q. 111, art. 8, ampl. 18, n. 177, p. 677: 'Vt puniatur iudex, qui pecuniam 
accepit ob aliquid faciendum, etiam quod non fecerit id, quod facere promisit, text(us) expressus in l. et generaliter, 
§ si igitur, ff. de calumniat[oribus] (D.3.6.3.1) cuius tex(tus) verba sunt haec: Si igitur accepit, ut negotium faceret 
siue fecit, siue non fecit, tenetur, et qui accepit ne faceret, et si fecit tenetur. Et ibi gl. in verbo siue non fecit notat 
puniri in hoc crimine propositum, licet non sequatur effectus [cf. Gloss ad D.3.6.3.1, § Siue non fecit, Parisiis 
1566, vol. 1, col. 468: 'et sic punitur propositum, licet non sequatur effectus'], et Bal. in fi. testatur fuisse 
determinatum Florentiae contra quendam, qui in officio commiserat barattariam, et re integra poenituerat, et haec 
poenitentia sibi non prosuit [cf. Baldus ad D.3.6.3, In Primam Digesti veteris partem commentaria (note 28), fol. 
218r] ... quod officialis attentans barattariam punitur' (emphasis in the text). 
47 E.g. Garcia Mastrillus (c.1570-1620), De magistratibus, eorum imperio et jurisdictione tractatus, Panormi, 
Apud Franciscum Ciottum Venetum, 1616, pt. 2, lib. 6, ch. 10, p. 287, n. 34-35: 'excusantur officiales inquisiti de 
extorsione, si ante litem contestatam, vel sententiam non animo confitendi delictum, sed ad redimendum propriam 
vexationem, pecunias, aut res extortas depositent .... licet aliud sit in crimine barattariae, et caeteris atrocioribus 
criminibus ...' (emphasis added). 
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it was often the case, such finesse was of little interest to the bench, which simply considered 
barratry as repetundae.48 
Qualifying the bribing of the judge as barratry - and so as crimen repetundarum - was of 
considerable importance not just for the study of Roman sources, but also and especially for 
the application of new legislation. The edict of 1503 issued by Ferdinand II of Aragon for the 
kingdom of Sicily, for instance, prohibited to initiate ex officio legal proceedings against the 
magistrates of the kingdom unless for a few and particularly serious cases, including 
extortions.49 The provision did not call that crime barratry, but the connection looked obvious 
to the jurists, who subsumed the new provision within ius commune categories and interpreted 
it accordingly.50  
 
4. Simony 
The explanation of barratry-repetundae as barter did not prove especially influential, but it 
helps to make sense of another meaning of the term in English, that of simony: bartering 
spiritual benefits for money. One of the earliest - and surely the most known - British records 
on the point is a statute of James I of Scotland of 1428.51 Terming simony as barratry is not as 
rare as one might think. For instance, a century earlier, the Istorie Fiorentine of Matteo Villani 
(1283-1363) give a rather vivid account of a similar and more serious case that happened in 
Florence in 1345.52 The connection between barratry and simony could not have been so 
                                                     
48 Among the court decisions on the barratry of the judge, special mention should be made at least for a sentence 
of the Florentine criminal Rota rendered by Marcantonio Savelli (c.1624-1695) in 1679, where the term 'barratry' 
(baratteria) was considered as the equivalent in the vernacular of the crimen repetundarum: Marci Antonii Sabelli 
... Summa Diversorum Tractatuum ... collecta, ac propriis locis distributa a Leopoldo Josepho Crescini, Venetiis, 
ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1748, vol. 3, s.v. 'Officia', p. 320, n. 23). Incidentally, it should be noted that Savelli's 
treatment of judicial barratry is probably the best that could be found for the whole seventeenth century. It did not 
happen frequently that a pre-eminent judge of an important criminal court wrote on the corruption of fellow 
judges. The discussion of barratry-repetundarum may be found ibid., p. 320-325, n. 20-84, together with the 
consilium of the Roman jurist Alexander Lucidum, counsel for the plaintiff in the same proceedings, ibid., p. 325-
327. 
49 Capitula Regni Siciliae, quae ad Hodiernum diem Lata sunt, Panormi, 1741, ezcudebat (sic) Angelus Felicella, 
vol. 1, ch. 39, § Quod Sindicatores non se intromittant de male gestis officialium, p. 540. 
50 Marius Giurba (1565-1649), Consilia seu Decisiones Criminales, Coloniae Allobrogum, excudebat Philippus 
Albertus, 1629, cons. 72 (decision of 24.1.1594), n. 6-7 and 13-14: 'Alias baractariam committet Iudex, licet 
coloratum aliquem mutui titulum alleget ... et recipiendo iura, vltra pandectas a sponte dantibus, per Magistrum 
Notarium non taxata, baractaria est ... Cumque iuratus a Seio, in Curia litigante, vncias sex receperit, Baractariam 
ab eo commissam probat Fiscus; etsi sponte ipse soluerit ... Vt in poena quatrupli (sic), exilij, et fustigationis 
puniendus sit, iure communi inspecto ... Siue ad iudicandum, vel non, dummodo accipiat quod non debet ... 
Cumque baractariae crimen sola promissione committi probauerit Fiscus ... quod atrox cum sit crimen, punitur 
affectus, nullo secuto effectu ... Nec re integra, poenitentiae locus est in baractariae crimine, vt euitare possit 
poenam.' 
51 APS ii 16, c.9 (=RPS 1428/3/10): 'Item, it is ordained that no cleric, religious or secular, pass out of the realm 
unless he comes to his ordinary first, [or then] to the chancellor of the realm and show him good and honest cause 
for his passage, and make faith to him that he will do no barratry, and have his letters of licence and witnessing. 
And if any does the contrary or makes barratry, when it is known with sufficient and good document, that he 
undergo the statute made against those that take money out of the country. And that this statute be not only 
extended to those who do barratry in times to come, but also to those now outwith the realm that are convicted of 
barratry. Also the king forbids that any of his lieges send expenses to any barrator that is now outwith the realm, 
nor give them help nor favour in whatever degree that pertains to them until they come home to the realm 
(emphasis added). 
52 Giovanni Villani, Istorie Fiorentine di Giovanni Villani ... vol. 8, Milan 1803, ch. 58, p. 146-148. According to 
Villani (in fact, the author for the period we are interested in is his brother Matteo), the Florentine inquisitor (one 
friar Peter of Aquila) used the accusation of heresy to blackmail the city. Villani's chronicle reports how that 
inquisitor threatened the excommunication of both Prior and Captain of Florence and a general interdict to 
Florence itself if the city did not pay a conspicuous debt owed by the (by then, bankrupt) Acciaiuoli company. 
Florence immediately appealed before the pope and brought evidence of 'all the baratterie and rivenderie of that 
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remote if it can be found even in some of the most widely read legal repertories, such as that 
of the cardinal Dominicus Tuschus (Domenico Toschi, 1535-1620).53 
The link between judicial corruption and simony might appear somewhat far-fetched to us. But 
it is important to remember the gravity of the crime of barratry-repetundae in the context of a 
medieval city-state. Perhaps the best explanation for the link between bribe and simony is to 
be found in the first complete English translation of the whole Divine Comedy, that of Henry 
Boyd (published in 1802), who rendered Dante's barattaria (implied in line 40 of canto 21) 
with 'State-Simony'. It is precisely because of the connection between repetundae and simony 
that this meaning of the term barratry is only present in Scots law and not also in English law: 
without barratry-repetundae it would be hard to think of barratry-simony. 
 
 5. Fraud of the shipmaster  
If one were to take the trouble to make a thorough research in early modern civil law books, 
the term barratry would appear frequently enough, but most of the times in the sense of bribe 
taken by the judge to absolve the defendant. Up to the late fifteenth century, the use of barratry 
as fraudulent conduct of the shipmaster among civil lawyers is very rarely attested; it is only 
from the late sixteenth century that its mention becomes less sporadic. By then, as already said, 
barratry meant first and foremost judicial corruption. This is very important, for it would have 
significant consequences on the understanding of barratry as fraud of the shipmaster. In 
Transposing barratry-corruption into a context as different as the maritime one ultimately 
meant adapting a pre-existing criminal offence to a contractual scenario so far regulated by 
commercial usages. 
Despite the profound difference between the two cases, the link between barratry-repetundae 
and barratry of the shipmaster was not difficult to draw. The parallel was perhaps facilitated 
by a passage of the Digest (Dig.48.10.21),54 equating some fraudulent transactions to the 
corruption of a judge. Although the connection might not be immediately evident in Roman 
law,55 it was sufficiently clear to early modern civilians. By then, the corruption of a judge was 
the quintessence of the crimen repetundarum, leading beyond doubt to a false verdict. The 
distance between a fraudulent (and so, voidable) private transaction and a false public act was 
rather short, all the more since the separation between public and private law was still 
emerging. So, for instance, in a decision of the high court of Sicily of the early seventeenth 
century, the defendant (who allegedly sold something twice) stood charged with both theft and 
barratry because of the connection in the Digest between the lex Cornelia de falsis and the 
corruption of a judge.56 
                                                     
inquisitor', amounting to more than 7,000 golden florins. The Florentine ambassadors accused the friar of being 
'disloyal and barrator' (disleale e barattiere), although apparently the pope did not prove too sympathetic towards 
the Florentines. 
53 Dominicus Tuschus (1535-1620), Practicarvm Conclvsionvm Ivris … Dominici TT. S. onvphrii S.R.E. Presbyt. 
Card. Tvschi (3rd edn.), Lvdgvni, ex Officina Ioannis Pillehotte, sumpt. Ioannis Caffin, et Francisci Plaignard, 
1624, vol. 1, concl. 26, p. 295: 'Barattaria est crimen, quod vulgus interpretatur esse illud, quod committit Iudex 
mediante pecunia … Amplia, quia Iudex committit barattariam, et simoniam, etiamsi iustam sententiam ferat'. 
54 D.48.10.22 (Paul ad s.c. Libonianum): ‘Qui duobus in solidum eandem rem diversis contractibus vendidit, 
poena falsi coercetur, et hoc et divus Hadrianus constituit. Is adiungitur et is qui iudicem corrumpit. Sed remissius 
puniri solent, ut ad tempus relegentur nec bona illis auferantur.’ 
55 The text of Dig.48.10.21 is probably to be explained with the progressive extension of the scope of the Lex 
Cornelia de falsis: cf. Dig.48.10.1.2. 
56 Hieronymus Basilicus (Girolamo Basilico, d.1670), Decisiones Criminales Magnae Regiae Curiae Regni 
Siciliae ..., Authore D. Hieronymo Basilico ... (2nd edn.), Florentiae, 1691, ex Typhographia Joannis Philippi 
Cecchi, dec. 38, p. 334, n. 1: the person charged with selling something twice is accused of 'furti, et barattariae, 
quae nos vocamus, quando aliquis unam rem duobus vendit, vel fallit, aut decipit ... et puto, quod ratio sit, quod 
utrimque sub eadem poena falsi contineatur, et idem text. in l. qui duobus, unico contextu de utroque loquatur, ad 
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Probably the clearest link between maritime and judicial barratry is to be found in the Italian 
jurist Benvenuto Stracca (1509–1578), who devotes to the subject the whole, lengthy gloss n. 
31 of his famed treatise on insurance. Stracca does not start his discussion on barratry with the 
shipmaster, but with the judge, to whom he devotes a first long paragraph.57  
Just as any coeval civilian would have done, Stracca maintains that barratry is first of all the 
bribe taken by the judge. The reason why the crimen repetundarum is called barattaria, he 
explains, lies in its etymology – barter. Indeed, the judge does something he should not in 
exchange for something else (a personal gain). Moving from such an incipit to maritime 
barratry, admittedly, might appear somewhat difficult. But the way Stracca does so is revealing. 
The first example he provides is that of the shipmaster who takes a bribe from the Turks to take 
onboard a spy of the Sultan disguised as a Christian. If the ship is subsequently seized and, 
with her, also the insured cargo, then the master may well be said to have committed barratry.58 
Such a case (hypothetical though far from unrealistic, especially at the time when the fear of 
Turkish spies was at its apex) hardly lies at the core of maritime barratry. But it allows Stracca 
to shift his analysis of barratry from a judicial to a maritime context. The master uses his 
position to render an illegal service against money: in doing so, he accepts the risk that the 
insured merchandise might be seized. The causal link between seizure of cargo and unlawful 
gain of the master is indirect, but it suffices to show the connection between maritime barratry 
and the bribe received so to abuse of one’s position of authority. The next example of Stracca 
is a variation on the same theme. Now the shipmaster does not need the help of Turkish spies, 
and brings the ship with its cargo to the Turks by himself.59 The connection with the previous 
case is clear, but so is also the increasing focus on the thing-at-risk. This time it is possible to 
speak of a direct causal relationship between fraudulent behaviour of the master and the 
mishap.  
After this second example Stracca moves away from the facio-ut-des scheme of corruption. 
Now the master stops working for the Turks and, so to say, goes freelance: he first overinsures 
the ship and then sinks it deliberately.60 This, it may be noted, is a classic case of maritime 
barratry, the previous two were not. Precisely for this reason, it is significant that Stracca does 
not begin with it but rather leads his reader towards it, building on the link with repetundae. 
From now on, Stracca's discussion focuses on 'proper' cases of barratry of the master. But the 
mark of judicial barratry is still present. Indeed, when providing a general description (but not 
a proper definition) of the barratry of the master, Stracca remarks how the behaviour of the 
shipmaster may consist of actions or omissions aimed at a specific fraudulent purpose.61 This 
description is the same as Stracca’s initial definition of (judicial) barratry, which was taken 
from the famed de Syndicatu of Amodeus Justinus (the acceptance of some benefit by an 
official from a private person to do what he should not or not to do what he should).62  
To the modern reader, Stracca's convoluted approach might appear a little puzzling. One would 
be tempted to argue that Stracca needed neither Justinus' definition nor, more in general, the 
blueprint of judicial barratry to describe the maritime one. The work of Stracca, it should be 
                                                     
l. Cornel. de falsis (D.48.10.21); Barattariam autem nomen esse barbarum, neque a legum conditioribus neque a 
Latinis usurpatum, sed inventum a recentioribus Jurisperitis, ut corruptionem Judicis significarent'. 
57 Clarissimi Ivrisc. Benvenvti Stracchae ..., De Assecurationibus, Tractatus. ..., Venetiis, 1569, gl. 31, fol. 128r-
v, n. 1. 
58  Ibid., fol. 128v, n. 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., fol. 129r. 
61 Ibid., 'Et denique generaliter dicendum est si magister nauis, seu scriba per calliditatem quid fecerint, aut non 
fecerint, unde nauis amissio sequuta fuerit, seu merces deperditae, aut deteriores fint redditae, exceptio haec 
assecurantibus prosit tanquam in formula excepta, et ex conuentione permissa etc.' (emphasis added). 
62 Supra, note 42. 
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noted, is remarkably focused and (at least for the standards of the times) practically-minded: 
he glosses an insurance policy with the precise intent to explain how does the policy work and 
when can one sue on it. In his treatise there is no room for theoretical digressions. And yet that 
on barratry is the only gloss where Stracca takes such a long detour to reach the point. This 
does not seem fortuitous. When writing his insurance treatise, Stracca was thinking of disputes 
before law courts, not mercantile consulates. As such, he had to persuade civil lawyers that 
maritime barratry was but an adaptation of the kind of barratry they were more familiar with. 
Moving from the crimen repetundarum to explain maritime barratry was not necessary. But it 
was the best way to make sure that law courts would accept what for them was a new concept. 
By the time Stracca wrote his treatise (first published in 1569), most law courts had yet to take 
notice of the barratry of the shipmaster. And civil law courts - just as any law court - had always 
to build on something known and widely accepted. Had Stracca done otherwise, bringing a 
maritime custom within the civil law framework would have been considerably more difficult. 
In this process of reception of a maritime custom into the civil law, the particular position of 
the shipmaster might have helped. The master of the vessel was entrusted with particular 
powers, making him a public official of sort. It is possible that the courts might have opposed 
more resistance against the analogy between repetundae and the fraud perpetrated by a 
different subject. But it was precisely because of the special position of authority traditionally 
recognised to the captain of a vessel that his fraudulent scheming looked to the courts 
sufficiently homogeneous with that of the bribe pocketed by the magistrate - or at least not too 
remote from it.  
Stracca's treatment of maritime barratry is important because of the effort to bring it within the 
civil law framework as a sub-category of repetundae. Perhaps because of this, however, it lacks 
clear definitions. Reading Stracca one is left with the clear impression that barratry is some 
sort of mischief, but its specific features remain somewhat vague. 
 
 
6. Customary law: barratry and blameworthiness 
This vagueness is more than a simple impression: it is what often happens when lawyers look 
at customs. As said above, Stracca provided a description of the barratry of the master, not a 
definition. He did so because he sought to explain a customary rule, making it intelligible to a 
readership of civil lawyers, without twisting (too much) both scope and working of the custom. 
Providing a legal definition would have had far more profound effects, for the approach of the 
lawyers diverged from that of the merchants not just on some specific features of certain kinds 
of liability, but on the way itself in which responsibility should be ascribed. 
Maritime customs qualified barratry first of all within the sea-carriage context. Insurance rules 
came (or became widespread enough) only later. In a pre-insurance context, therefore, there 
were only two parties – merchant and shipmaster. In such a scenario, there was little point in 
providing a sharp distinction between fault and fraud of the master. Rather, it made more sense 
to divide mishaps depending on whether or not the shipmaster was to be blamed for the mishap. 
The shipmaster warranted safe delivery at destination, barring several events that we would 
qualify as vis maior.63 On the face of it, liability might appear strict. In fact, the fortuitous 
events mentioned in most charter-parties just provided a typical - but not exhaustive – list of 
cases where the master could not be blamed for the loss. Blameworthiness dispensed with strict 
                                                     
63 I intend to work further on this crucial point in other studies within the project ‘Average-Transaction Costs and 
Risk Management during the First Globalization (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)’. The position of the 
shipmaster is normally studied either with regard to insurance or to sea-trade at large (and so, in terms of liability 
as common carrier), but not towards the merchants as a group. In a maritime context, the dichotomy between 
imputable vs. accidental loss was elaborated first of all with regard to averages, not to insurers or common carriers, 
and its development did have significant repercussions on both the other subjects. 
 13 
proof of causation. Detaching oneself from the usual modus operandi of one’s peers was itself 
evidence of faulty behaviour. It was up to the master to provide a reasonable explanation for 
his conduct, persuading his judges that, if he acted differently from what could be expected, he 
did so for a good reason.  
The advent of insurance (or rather, its increasingly widespread use) progressively required to 
distinguish blameworthiness into fault and fraud. On the one hand, the insured could well be 
the shipmaster himself; on the other, and especially, the insurance policy covered the merchant 
for loss due to the shipmaster’s negligence, but it would not necessarily go beyond that. This 
does not mean that merchants suddenly launched themselves into complex discussions as to 
the precise boundaries between fault and fraud - merchants have always shown better sense 
than us lawyers. Rather, they began to shift the discussion from imputable vs. non-imputable 
loss to intentional vs. unintentional loss. This distinction, it should be noted, was ultimately 
elaborated within blameworthiness, a general and wide criterion referring to the conduct - not 
to the actual loss.64 As such, the question of intentionality was not referred to the mishap, but 
to the behaviour of the shipmaster. The basic approach to the whole issue remained therefore 
similar. If the shipmaster deviated from the usual conduct expected of him, that was taken as 
intentional: it was the master who would have to provide an explanation for his conduct. While 
the evidence is not as abundant and precise as one might wish, it would seem that an important 
criterion used – or, more often, implied – in the distinction between fault and fraud (or rather, 
between intentional and unintentional blameworthy conduct) was the divide between 
omissions and positive actions. If the shipmaster forgot to do something, or just did something 
badly, that would prima facie look negligent. But if he actually committed some very 
unorthodox action, that would appear to be fraudulent.65  
 
 
7. Provisional conclusion 
Barratry, as we have seen, had several and different meanings. That of fraud of the shipmaster 
was the last one that law courts noticed. In taking notice of it, the bench was deeply influenced 
by other and (at least for the judges) older and more important meanings of the same term. 
Despite their different focus, all such meanings described liability in clear terms of causality 
and intentionality: a specific conduct deliberately leading to a certain result. In their effort to 
qualify the barratrous behaviour of the shipmaster, civil law courts provided a stringent 
definition based on both elements: strict causality and clear proof of intentionality. Only if the 
judge was satisfied as to both requisites (which the counter-party had to prove in full) would 
the shipmaster be considered a barrator. Civil law courts thus inverted the approach of the older 
mercantile justice. By contrast, in the common law the decision as to the occurrence of the fact 
was left to the jury. As such, the bench did not have to pronounce on whether the behaviour of 
the shipmaster was to be qualified as barratrous, nor did the jury have to justify its choice. 
                                                     
64 Blameworthiness is among the widest and most far-reaching concepts in the whole history of medieval and 
early modern commercial law - and of course well beyond it. Clearly it may not be discussed here in any detail. 
A conduct worth of blame - even the simple breaking of one's word - could have profound consequences with 
regard to the position of that person. That position should not be distinguished in social and legal terms: the one 
of course influenced and even determined the other. So it is well possible to think at the same time of ill-repute in 
terms of a sort of 'betrayal of the res publica' on the one hand, and to find a shipmaster condemned by a law court 
for a behaviour formally correct but substantially dishonest on the other. See respectively G. Todeschini, La 
reputazione economica come fattore di cittadinanza nell’Italia dei secoli XIV-XV, in I. Lori Sanfilippo and A. 
Rigon (eds.), Fama e publica vox nel medioevo, Rome 2011, p. 105-118, at 107, and M. Fusaro, Seamen's 
Employment and States' Jurisdiction, the View from the Early Modern Mediterranean, in A. Cordes, S. Dauchy, 
D. De ruysscher, H. Philajamäki (eds.), Historiography of Commercial Law: Past, Present, and Future 
(forthcoming). 
65 See further G. Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan England. The London Code, Cambridge 2016, p. 274-281. 
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During the early modern times, these two different approaches of the law courts led to very 
different results, even though the starting point (the understanding that merchants had of 
barratry) was the same. It remains now to be seen how this happened.66  
 
 
                                                     
66 Cf. G. Rossi, The Barratry of the Shipmaster in Early Modern Law: The Approach of Italian and English Law 
Courts, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 86 (2019), p. ***. 
